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Abstract
This research focuses upon the impacts that the expiration of
option contracts, errors in forecasts for earnings and inflation, and
trading volume had upon daily changes in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (DJIA) during 1978. The results indicate that, ceteris paribus ,
the expiration of option contracts depresses changes in the DJIA.
Statistical evidence consistently confirmed the drair.atic effect of unan-
ticipated inflation on stock prices. Finally, a surprisingly strong
degree of market efficiency was detected. It appears that by the time
earnings announcements appear in the Wall Street Journal , it is too
late to react to this "new" information.

The Impacts of Options' Expiration, Unanticipated Inflation,
Errors in Forecasted Earnings,
and Trading Volume on Daily Market Returns*
During the last several years, a number of institutional changes
and economic events have affected the structure and performance of U.S.
equity markets. However, two factors, inflation and options trading,
have had a striking impact upon the market. The accelerating rate of
inflation has caused many investors to question v-hether increases in
corporate earnings and cash flow can offset the erosion of real corporate
purchasing power and dividends. Since the initiation of the trading of
listed call options on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) In
April 1973, investor interest in options and option trading volume has
surged. For example on several days during 1978, the stock trading
volume represented by option contracts for the 221 stocks listed on the
five options exchanges exceeded the actual share volume in all New
2
York Stock Exchange listed stocks for the days.
Theoretical developments in option pricing have closely paralleled
the growing popularity of these financial instruments. Professors Black
and Scholes, Merton, Parkinson, and Cox and Ross have developed general
The CBOE and Midwest Stock Exchange merged their options as of
June 2, 1980.
2
See Margaret D. Pacey, "The Striking Price," Barron's , Dow Jones
& Co., Vol. LIX, No. 1 (January 1, 1979), p. 37.
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equilibrium models for the option pricing problems. In addition, sev-
eral others have investigated either the efficiency of the U.S. options
4
market or examined alternative option writing strategies that one might
follow in order to reduce risk and/or increase return. Finally,
several studies have analyzed the impact that option contracts have upon
3
See for example Fisher Black and Myron Scholes, "The Pricing of
Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy , Vol.
81, No. 3 (May/June 1973), pp. 637-654; Robert Merton, "Theory of
P^tional Option Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics and Management
Science
,
Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 1973), pp. 141-183; Michael Parkinson,
"Options Pricing: The American Put," Journal of Business , Vol. 50, No.
1 (January 1977), pp. 21-36; and John C. Cox and Stephen A. Ross, "The
Valuation of Options for Alternative Stochastic Processes," Journal of
Financial Economics
, Vol. 3, No. 1/2 (January-March 1976), pp. 145-166.
4
See for example Joseph E. Finnerty, "The Chicago Board Options
Exchange and Market Efficiency," Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis
.
Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 1978), pp. 29-38; Robert C. Klemkosky,
"The Impact of Option Expiration on Stock Prices," Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis
, Vol. 13, No. 3 (September 1978), pp. 507-518;
Dan Galai, "Test of Market Efficiency of the Chicago Board Options
Exchange," Journal of Business , Vol. 50, No. 2 (April 1977), pp. 167-
197; and James D. MacBeth and Larry J. Merville, "An Empirical
Examination of the Black Scholes Call Option Pricing Model," Journal of
Finance
,
Vol. 34, No. 5 (December 1979), pp. 1173-1186.
See Michael J. Gambola, Rodney L. Roenfeldt, and Philip L. Cooley,
"Spreading Strategies on CBOE Options: Evidence on Market Performance,"
Journal of Financial Research , Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1978), pp. 33-44;
Gary L. Gastineau, The Stock Options Manual
, 2nd Edition (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1979); and Burton G. Malkiel and Richard E. Quandt,
Strategies and Rational Decisions in the Securities Option Market
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1969), for a limited sample.
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the volatility and returns of individual securities. Unfortunately
none of these studies focused upon the simultaneous interactions and
effects that options trading, inflation, and earnings announcements have
had upon the stock market. This study measures these interactions and
examines the impact of these factors during 1978 on daily price changes
of a widely used stock market indicator series. The measure of stock
market performance is a portfolio of thirty securities that comprise
the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)
.
The study is composed of five sections. Section I provides a brief
background on the "Dow 30", and the characteristics of the option con-
tracts for these stocks. Section II develops the hypotheses to be
tested, and section III contains a description of the statistical
procedures used to obtain estimates for "market" expectations. Section
IV contains results of the study, and the final section provides a sum-
mary and discusses the implications of the research.
Robert R. Nathan Associations, Inc., Review of Initial Trading
Experiences at the Chicago Board Options Exchange
,
prepared for the CBOE,
(December 1974), Chapter 2, and Sidney M. Robbins, Robert B. Stobaugh,
Francis L. Sterling, and Thomas H. Howe, "The Impact of Exchange-Traded
Options on the Market for New Issues of Common Stock of Small Companies,"
The Financial Review (Winter 1979), pp. 1-22; and Samuel L. Hayes, III
and Michael E. Tennenbaum, "The Impact of Listed Options on the
Underlying Shares," Financial Management , Vol. 8, No. 4 (Winter 1979),
pp. 72-76. For an alternative view see Robert Lenzher, "Call of the
Wild: Options—Despite Denials—Influence Movements in Stocks," Barron's
(May 3, 1976), p. 5.
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I. The DJIA and Option Contracts
Although there are better indices of stock market performance,
breadth, depth, and resiliency, no series is as widely quoted or
recognized as the DJIA. The companies that comprised the DJIA during
1978 are given in Table 1. The corporations in the index are generally
among the largest and most prestigious firms in their respective indus-
tries
.
As shewn in Table 1, twenty-five of the "Dow 30" had call options
traded on various exchanges during 1978. Indeed, twenty/ of the corpor-
ations had options that expired on the Saturday following the third
Friday of each January, April, July, and October. Four companies had
contracts that expired in February, May, August, and November; and one
corporation had a listed option with a March, June, September, and
December expiration series. An analysis of all 221 listed option con-
tracts traded in December, 1978 indicates that most options expire in
the Jan-Apr-July-Oct schema.
Q
Although capital market theory developed by Lintner and Sharpe
indicates that investors should hold portfolios comprised of market
weighted proportions of all types of investments, most empirical tests
See Jack C. Francis, Investments Analysis and Management , 3rd
edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), pp. 1A2-147, for a critique of
the DJIA's shortcomings and the characteristics desirable in a market
index.
o
John Lintner, "The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of
Risky Investment in Stock Portfolio and Capital Budgets," Review of
Economics and Statistics
, Vol. 47, No. 1 (February 1965), pp. 13-37 and
William Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium
Under Conditions of Risk," Journal of Finance
.
Vol. 19, No. 31 (September
1964), pp. 425-442.
-5-
Table 1
Description of Listed Option Contracts for the 30 Stocks in the DJIA Dow-Jones Thirty
Industrials - 1978*
Corporations****
Options Traded
Put Call Exchange Listing (s)
1978
Monthly Expirations
ied Chemical no yes
oa no yes
rican Brands no no
rlcan Can no no
T no yes
hi ehem Steel no yes
ysler no no
ont no yes
no yes
tman Kodak yes yes
ark*'^- no no
on no yes
eral Electric no yes
eral Foods no yes
eral Motors yes yes
ayear no yes
0** no no
ernational Harvester no yes
ernational Paper no yes
ns-Manville no yes
no yes
ns-Illinois no ves
cter & Gamble no yes
rs & Roebuck no yes
adard Oil of California no yes
aco no yes
Dn Carbide no yes
ted Technologies no yes
;. Steel no yes
i:inghouse yes yes
iLworth no yes
Philadelphia Exchange Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
n/a n/a
n/a n/a
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
n/a n/a
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
American Stock Exchange Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
n/a n/a
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct***
Cnicago Board Feb-Kay-Aug-Nov
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct***
American Stock Exchange Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
n/a n/a
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
Chicago Board Feb-May-Aug-Nov
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
Midwest Exchange Mar-Jun-Sep-Dec
American Stock Exchange Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
Chicago Board Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct***
American Stock Exchange Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct***
American Stock Exchange Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
American Stock Exchange Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
Chicago Board Feb-May-Aug-Nov
American Stock Exchange Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
American Stock Exchange Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct
Philadelphia Exchange Feb-May-Aug-Nov
I late June 1979 Chrysler and Esmark were replaced by International Business Machines
I), and Merck & Co. At that time puts and calls on IBM and calls on Merck were
sled on the Chicago Board for the Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct series.
Eimark was formerly Swift and Company; INCO was International Nickel.
*:n 1979 General Motors, General Electric, Standard Oil of California, and Sears
nracts expired in January, April, June, September and December.
*The majority of these corporations have fiscal quarters that end in March, June,
pember, and December. However, the fiscal quarters for Esmark, International
tester. Sears, and Woolworth end in January, April, July, and October. AT&T's
3al quarters end in February, May, August, and November.
U|Ce: Wall Street Journal and Barron's various issues, Dow-Jones & Company.
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of their theory are restricted to the universe of common stocks. Based
upon the popularity of the DJIA as an index of stock market performance,
one can view the DJIA as a proxy "market" portfolio, although it is un-
warranted to refer to the DJIA as the market portfolio because of the
index's composition. Indeed the composition of various market indices
has raised interesting questions concerning the testability of the Sharpe-
Lirtner capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and financial economists'
9
ability to adequately identify the market portfolio .
Nevertheless, James Lorie and Mary Hamilton have shown that cor-
relation coefficients between monthly closing values for the DJIA and
several widely used surrogates for the market are quite high. More
recent work by Reilly using daily percent price changes indicates
that these correlations persisted in the 1970 's.
Although one cannot confidently classify the DJIA as the market
portfolio , it does closely parallel broadly diversified portfolios de-
signed to capture stock market trends. Therefore, vre can ascertain
See Richard Roll, "A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests,
Part I: On Past and Potential Testability of the Theory," Journal of
Financial Economics , Vol. 4, No. 2 (March 1977), pp. 129-176, and
, "Ambiguity When Performance is Measured by the Securities
Market Line," Journal of Finance , Vol. 33, No. 4 (September 1978), pp.
1051-1069.
James H. Lorie and Mary T. Hamilton, "Stock Market Indexes," in
James Lorie and Richard Brealey (eds.). Modern Developments in Investment
Management , 2nd ed. (Hinsdale, 111.: Dryden Press, 1978), pp. 78-93.
Frank K. Reilly, Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management
(Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1979), pp. 130-131.
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the "systematic" impact, if any, that option expirations might have
upon daily stock price changes for this market proxy portfolio.
An analysis of daily closing prices during 1978 indicated that the
DJIA closed on Tuesday, January 3, 1978 at 817.74, reached a low closing
price of 742.12 on February 28th, a high closing price of 907.74 on
September 8th and 11th, and finished the year at 805.01 just 12.73
points below its initial value. An examination of daily trading volume
for the stocks In the DJIA during 1978 shows four significant high and
low spikes. These spikes occur on or near the Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct option
12
expiration dates. Finally, the analysis of daily price changes for
the DJIA during 1978 indicates similar patterns in the timing of the
spikes and option expiration dates but these relationships are not highly
correlated. Nevertheless, there appears to be some relationship between
option expiration, daily volume, and daily price changes for the DJIA
that justifies further analysis.
II. Factors Influencing Stock Price Changes
13
Eugene Fama (1976, p. 143) has characterized an efficient capital
market as follows:
12
Since 1976, expiration dates for all listed options contracts
fall on the Saturday following third Friday of each contract expiration
month. However, actual trading of contracts ceases on Friday afternoon.
During 1978 these expiration Fridays were Jan. 20th, Feb. 17th, Mar. 17th,
Apr. 21st, Hay 19th, Jun. 16th, Jul. 21st, Aug. 18th, Sep. 15th, Oct.
20th, Nov. 17th, and Dec. 15th.
13
Eugene F. Fama, "Reply to LeRoy," Journal of Finance , Vol. 31,
No. 1 (March 1976), pp. 143-145.
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Market efficiency requires that in setting the prices of
securities at any time, t-1, the market correctly uses all avail-
able information ... formally, in an efficient market
^(^i*t-i) = v^I<-l)' <i>
where P = (p, ,...,p ) is a vector of prices of securities at
time t, <ii^
-,
is a set of information available at t-1, (^ ^ is the
set of information used by the market, f (P^U^ i ) is the market'
' m t ' t-1
assessed density function for P , and f(P |4i ,) is the true den-
sity function implied by <{)
^
.
14
In terms of the Sharpe-Lintner capital asset pricing tnodel, the
expected return of the j th security from time t to t+1 can be described
as:
^^'^n, ^4.^l*^)-^J+^ cov(r ^,.,r .,, U^)
j.t+l'^f^ t+1
m,t+l' t m
cf(r„
.^-.UJ
''^'^-.t+l'^t^
In equation (2) r* is the return from t to t+1 on the riskless
asset; E is the expectations operator, r - is the return on the
14
John Lintner, "The Valuation of Risk Assets," op. cit . and
William Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices," op. cit .
Subsequent research by Black, Jensen, and Scholes as well as
Black has demonstrated that equation (2) may be inappropriate. Instead
they hypothesize a zero-beta factor E(r ) in place of the risk-free rate,
where E(r . |4) ) is the expected return on a risky portfolio, given (j) ,
that is uncorrelated with the market return. See Fisher Black, Michael
C. Jensen, and Myron Scholes, "The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some
Empirical Tests," in Michael C. Jensen, ed.. Studies in the Theory of
Capital Markets (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 79-121 and
Fisher Black, "Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing,"
Journal of Business, Vol. 45, No. 3 (July 19 72), pp. 444-454.
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"market portfolio," a(r ^.il<{i^) and cov(r. ^.,,r ^..U^) are respec-
m, t+i t J , t+i m, t+i t
tively the standard deviation of the market portfolio's return and the
covariance between the returns of the jth security and the market port-
folio; and the tildes denote random variables. The appearance of the
t terms indicates that the appropriate elements of equation (2) depend
upon a given information set. Although the reality of the model has
been criticized, it has been shown that most of the assumptions of the
CAPM can be relaxed without loss of generality.
The principal hypothesis of this study focuses upon the process
contained in equations (1) and (2). Many factors enter into the (ti in-
formation set used by investors to make financial decisions. However,
one would not expect a major disequilibrium to occur unless the new in-
formation was at variance with widely held beliefs or more precisely,
the beliefs that established the most recent price and hence return.
In an attempt to explain average daily price changes for the DJIA,
this study focuses upon four factors: (1) proximity to option contract
expiration dates, (2) unexpected changes in earnings, (3) unexpected
changes in inflation and (4) trading volume. Each of these factors
will be discussed below.
Options Contract Expiration
As Klemkosky has pointed out, a case can be made for the exis-
tence of downward pressure on the price of an underlying common stock
Michael C. Jensen, "Capital Markets: Theory and Evidence," Bell
Journal of Economics and Management Science
,
Vol. 3, No. 2 (Autumn 1972),
pp.. 357-39R.
Robert C. IClemkosky, "The Impact of Option Expirations," op. cit.
,
pp. 508-510.
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during the week prior to option expiration. Subsequently, during the
week after expiration, one would expect corrections back toward equili-
brium prices. These downward pressures can be caused by several factors.
First, call option buyers generally present most exercise or tender
notices during the final week of trading and after they receive their
shares, they in turn sell them. A sudden influx of call buyers "dumping"
their shares during the final week of the contract could create downward
selling pressure. Second, option prices can have a large time premium
depending upon the time remaining on the contract's life. This time
premium approaches zero as the contract approaches its expiration
date. If an option is "out of the money" (i.e., the price of the
underlying stock is less than the option's exercise or striking price)
as expiration approaches, the option will expire essentially worth-
less. If the seller or writer of a call has created a "variable
hedge" by acquiring the underlying stock, the v;riter of the call might
sell his/her hedged equity position during the last week because of the
small probability of a forthcoming exercise notice. Again such a sale
of the underlying stock could create downward pressure on stock prices.
Third, price declines can be generated when "in the money" (i.e., the
underlying stock price is above the striking price) writers attempt to
close out their positions during the expiration week. If a hedged writer
were to simultaneously buy back his/her option contract when time premiums
were lowest and sell the underlying "hedged shares," there would be dotvn-
ward price pressure in the stock market. However, offsetting upward
pressure in the options market might neutralize this effect.
-11-
18
Using a mean residual technique first suggested by Fama et al.
,
Klemkosky found support for his downward disequilibrium and correcting
hypothesis for the Jan-Apr-Jul-Oct and Aug-Nov-Feb-May expiration scheme
during 1975 and 1976. In contrast to Klemkosky's results, it is possi-
ble to argue that option expirations could cause significant upward
price and trading volume pressure before and after expiration dates.
For example if one assumes that a group of speculators have written a
19
series of "nakec'" calls, there could be a potential "short squeeze"
if there was a sudden and unanticipated acceleration in prices. In
order to prevent extraordinary losses, the "naked writers" must acquire
underlying shares or buy back their contracts. Thus there could be
significant upward price and volume momentum, and equilibrium prices
might not be reached for several trading days. The length of this dis-
equilibrium period would be a function of the degree of unanticipated
forecast error, and the ability of individuals to adjust their expecta-
tions to new, unexpected events. Kow much this short squeeze might
feed upon itself is difficult to predict. However, because of the
significant risks involved in writing naked calls, it is doubtful that
18
Eugene F. Fama, Lawrence Fisher, Michael C. Jensen, and Richard
Roll, "The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information," International
Economic Review , Vol. 10, No. 1 (February 1969), pp. 1-21.
19
A "naked" option implies that the writer does not have an owner-
ship position in the option's underlying common stock. Thus in the
event of an unexpected price rise, the call writer must acquire either
the stock or repurchase the option, thereby creating significant upward
price pressure. Most brokerage firms require at least $10,000 on de-
posit in brokerage house accounts in order to be eligible to write
"naked" calls.
-12-
they could provide overwhelming momentum. Still, options specialists
and market makers who operate continuously in the market might cause
this type of short squeeze.
The previous discussion indicated that momentum could be generated
by a sudden and unexpected acceleration in stock prices. Further, this
momentum could be amplified if stock price inertia pushed a significant
number of options "into the money." The data in Table 2 provide in-
sight into this momentum or acceleration phenomenon. Specifically,
Table 2 contains the open interest (i.e., num.ber of contracts out-
standing) and the relative changes in "in the money" - "out of the
money" classifications for all call contracts outstanding on the
twenty-five DJIA corporations with listed options. The number of out-
standing contracts are taken three weeks and one week prior to expira-
tion. Two interesting trends are apparent in the total open interest
values during 1978. First, the total number of options outstanding tends
to increase during January, April, July, and October. Of course these
are the contract expiration months for twenty of the twenty-five DJIA
components with listed options. Second, there were more contracts
outstanding one week prior to the 1978 monthly expiration dates than
were in effect two weeks earlier. A means test was performed to deter-
mine if there was a statistically significant difference between the
average total option open interest one and three weeks prior to the
January, April, July and October expiration dates and the remaining
average outstanding open interest figures. The results of this test
indicated the null hypothesis of equal means can be rejected at the
.025 level. This implies support for the alternative hypothesis that
-13-
TABLE 2
Outstanding Call Option Contract Volume for the DJIA - 1978*
Outstanding Option Contract Open Interest
78 # Weeks
ntract Expiration
tes
1
Prior to
Expiration
3
1
Date
12/30
1/13
"In the Money"
% of
# Total
134,971 28.3
48,888 10,3
"Out of the Money"
% of
Total
71.7
89.7
Total
nuary 20th
bruary 17th
341,058
426,531
476,209
475,419
3
1
1/27
2/10
35,664
63,132
10.6
17.5
301,941
297,125
89.
4
82.5
337,605
360,257
irch 17 th 3
1
2/24
3/10
52,062
62,377
13.5
14.9
334,095
356,625
86.5
85.1
386,157
419,002
ril 21st
y 19th
3
1
3/31
4/14
89,660
160,300
19.5
35.2
369,977
294,526
80.5
64.8
459,637
454,826
3
1
4/28
5/12
205,504
178,434
58.4
43.7
146,310
230,135
41.6
56.3
351,814
408,569
me 16th 3
1
5/26
6/9
117,867
191,307
26.2
39.2
332,550
296,469
73.8
60.8
450,417
487,776
ily 21st
1
3
1
6/30
7/14
126,452
185,002
23.3
32.5
417,243
383,892
76.7
67.5
543,695
568,894
igust 18 th 3
1
7/28
8/11
169,943
226,961
38.3
44.0
273,960
289,427
61.7
56.0
443,903
516,388
.ptember 15 th
1
3
1
8/25
9/8
177,413
198,640
31.9
33.9
378,827
386,940
68.1
66.1
556,240
585,580
tober 20th 3
1
9/29
10/13
167,952
216,156
28.9
34.1
413,393
417,144
71.1
65.9
581,345
633,300
ivember 17 th 3
1
10/27
11/10
49,632
59,932
11.6
12.7
379,786
412,314
88.4
87.3
429,418
472,246
.cember 15 th 3
1
11/24
12/8
97,614
90,187
20.7
18.0
374,383
411,232
79.3
82.0
471,997
501,419
*Source, Barron * s
,
Dow-Jones, Inc. various issues.
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there was a significant increase in the number of options on the DJIA
components during 1978 for the period around contract expiration dates.
Also a means test was performed to determine if there was a statistical
difference between the number of contracts outstanding one and three
weeks prior to the monthly expiration dates during 1978. The results
Indicated that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the number of
contracts outstanding on the DJIA components one and three weeks prior
to the 1978 option expiration dates are equal.
Clearly something was at work prior to the DJIA option expiration
dates in 19 78. The question remains whether these forces could create
upward market price and volume momentum.
Unexpected Changes in Earnings
20
Numerous prior studies have tested the joint hypothesis
that the market is efficient and that asset returns are generated
21by some form of the CAPM (equation 2). These studies generally
concluded that statistically significant and positive risk adjusted re-
turns are observed after earnings announcements. The accumulated evi-
dence of these studies provides strong evidence that (1) the efficient
market process as described by equation (1) may not adequately describe
reality at least in the short-run; (2) the inefficiency implied is not
substantial and abnormal risk-adjusted returns will probably be negated
20
See Eugene Fama, "Reply to LeRoy," op. cit
., pp. 143.
21
For an enlightening review see Ray Ball, "Anomalies in
Relationships Between Securities' Yield and Yield Surrogates," Journal
of Financial Economics, Vol. 6, No. 23 (June/ September 1978), pp. 103-126.
-15-
by transactions costs; and (3) deficiencies in the CAPM return generat-
22
ing process do not explain abnormal returns.
Because this study focuses upon the daily price change character-
istics of a market portfolio proxy, there is no adjustment for risk.
By definition, if the DJIA is a market surrogate , it cannot provide
abnormal returns. Clearly this does not imply that earnings announce-
ments made by the individual ccrporations in the DJIA will have no
effect upon the index. On the contrary, unless controls are established
to account for the timing of earnings' announcements and the magnitude
of forecast errors, significant bias v/ill result.
Table 3 contains a detailed summary of the publication dates for
quarterly earnings for companies in the DJIA made during 1978. It is
hypothesized that these announcements could have had a significant
impact upon investor expectations, if the earnings were at variance
23
with expectations . Notably, many of these publication dates
are clustered around the January 20th, April 21st, July 21st, and
October 20th option trading expiration dates in 1978. Thus there may
22
Ross L. Watts, "Systematic 'Abnormal' Returns After Quarterly
Earnings Announcements," Journal of Financial Economics , Vol. 6, No. 23
(June/ September 1978), pp. 127-150.
23
James M. Patell and Mark A. VJolfson, "Anticipated Information
Releases in Call Option Prices," Journal of Accounting and Economics
,
Vol. 1, No. 2 (August 1979), and and , "Prelim-
inary Evidence of the Effect of Quarterly Earnings and Dividend Announce-
ments on Call Option Prices," Working Paper, Graduate School of Business,
Stanford University (March 1979), provides strong evidence that implied
standard deviations imbedded within option prices typically increases
prior to earnings announcements and decline thereafter.
-16-
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be a contemporaneous interaction between option expiration and earnings
announcements effects.
Unexpected Changes in the Rate of Inflation
The previous discussion of market efficiency placed strong empha-
sis upon expectations and unanticipated departures from forecasts. In
a pathbreaking work on the development of a theory of the term structure
24
of interest rates, David Meiselman provided strong evidence that an
"error-learning" mechanism is a dominant factor in investors revision
of Interest rate expectations.
The option pricing procedure developed by Black and Scholes
shows that a key determinant of equilibrium involves the creation of
a riskless hedge, which will earn the risk-free rate of interest. In
26
addition, Merton has shown that option values will increase as this
riskless rate increases. As a result, unexpected increases in the risk-
free rate will, ceteris paribus
,
generate unexpected increases in option
prices, and hence upward price and volume pressure.
Notably, unexpected increases in the riskless rate could also gen-
erate downward price pressure on underlying stock prices. In this
24
David Meiselman, The Term Structure of Interest Rates
,
(Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962).
25
Fisher Black and Myron Scholes, "The Pricing of Options," op. cit
.
26
Robert Merton, "The Theory of Rational Option Pricing," op. cit .
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27
'
regard, Fama (1975, 1977) has demonstrated that short-term interest
rates accurately mirrored expected rates of inflation during the period
28
1953-1971, His results tend to confirm Fisher's view that the nominal
rate of interest represents some expected real return plus an assessment
of the expected rate of inflation.
29
Similarly, John Lintner contends that equity prices will de-
cline during transition periods in which actual inflation rates are
higher than expected rates. In contrast, during transition periods when
accual rates of inflation are below expected rates, unusually large cap-
ital gains will occur. This logic explains the persistent trend for both
nominal and real returns on equity securities to be negatively and signi-
ficantly related to inflation rates. Convincing support for Lintner 's
30
thesis is given by numerous studies. They show that although equity
securities have often been touted as a major hedge against inflation,
actual equity returns during periods of high inflation were rather per-
verse as inflation hedges.
27
Eugene F. Fama, "Short-Term Interest Rates as Predictors of
Inflation," American Economic Review , Vol. 65, No. 3 (June 1975), pp.
269-282 and , "Interest Rates and Inflation: The Message
in the Entrails," American Economic Review , Vol. 67, No. 3 (June 1977),
pp. 487-496.
28
Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest (New York: MacMillan and
Co., 1930).
29
John Lintner, "Inflation and Security Returns," Journal of
Finance , Vol. 30, No. 2 (May 1975), pp. 259-280.
on
In this regard, see Eugene F. Fama and G. William Schwert, "Asset
Returns and Inflation," Journal of Financial Economics , Vol. 5, No. 2 (November
1977), pp. 115-146; Frank K. Reilly, Glenn L. Johnson, and Ralph E. Smith,
"Inflation, Inflation Hedges and Common Stock," Financial Analysts Journal ,
Vol. 26, No. 1 (January-February, 1970), pp. 104-110; F. K. Reilly, R. E.
Smith, and G. L. Johnson, "A Correction and Update Regarding Individual
Stocks As Inflation Hedges," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis ,
Vol. 8, No. 2 (March, 1973), pp. 247-258.
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The foregoing analysis yields some rather curious conclusions.
First, unanticipated increases in inflation will create upward pressure
on interest rates and therefore option prices, but downward pressure on
stock prices. Conversely, unanticipated decreases in inflation rates
will have the opposite effects. Accordingly, it seems reasonable that
forecasted errors in anticipated rates of inflation should have an im-
pact upon stock prices; however, the existence of option contracts might
well dampen this reaction.
Trading Volume
In describing the possible impacts that options contract expira-
tion, unexpected changes in earnings and inflation might have on daily
changes in the DJIA, little attention was paid to the pervasiveness of
a particular forecasting error. That is, none of these variables directly
captures the depth and breath of a particular announcement surprise. It
is hypothesized that trading volume could serve as a proxy for the degree
of this surprise.
For example, a totally unanticipated economic event would prob-
ably effect all market participants, albeit in varying degrees. As
a result many individuals or institutions might take action to alter
their stock ownership positions. An excellent indicator of portfolio
restructuring is trading volume. Clearly then, the greater the degree
31
of surprise the higher the volume. Recent research by Epps strongly
31
Thomas W. Epps, "Security Price Changes and Transaction Volumes:
Theory and Evidence," Am.erican Economic Review , Vol. 65, No. 4 (September
1974), pp. 586-597 and , "The Distribution of Security Price
Changes: A Test of a Volume-Mixture Model with Cauchy Disturbances,"
Operations Research
, Vol. 28, No. 5 (September-October 1980), pp.
1205-1212.
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supports this hypothesis. Therefore, trading volume was included as
an explanatory variable,
III. Derivation of Expectational Variables
The previous section provided a theoretical justification for uti-
lizing option expiration dates, unanticipated changes in inflation,
errors in forecasted earnings, and trading volume to explain daily
changes in the DJIA. To test these relationships, reasonable approxi-
mations for expected rates of inflation, and earnings are necessary.
The earnings and inflation estimates presented in this study were de-
rived via a set of univariate Box-Jenkins time series models.""" The
form and structure of these forecasting models is given in Table 4.
The first model described in Table 4 was used to forecast fourth
quarter 1977 through third quarter 1978 earnings per share (EPS) for the
DJIA. Quarterly EPS figures for the DJIA covering the period 1920-1979
were obtained from the editorial staff at Barron's . One significant ad-
justment was made to the data. In the fourth quarter 1977, Bethlehem
Steel announced a negative quarterly EPS of $10.92; $8.45 of this loss
was a one time charge. Accordingly, an upward adjustment for this extra-
ordinary item was made to avoid biasing the EPS estimation series.
Quarterly EPS figures from January, 1950 through September, 1977 were
used to identify and estimate the DJIA's EPS figures. The Box-Jenkins
EPS forecasting model utilized one seasonal difference of order four
and one regular difference in conjunction with a moving average param-
eter of order four.
32
George E. P. Box and Gwilyn M. Jenkins, Time Series Analysis ;
Forecasting and Control, Revis. Ed. (San Francisco: Holden Day, 1976).
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The actual and forecasted EPS figures given in Table 5 indicate
several interesting results. The actual earnings figure reported for
the fourth quarter 1977 and third quarter 1978 are slightly below the
forecasted values. In contrast, actual earnings for the first and second
quarters are above the forecasts. In fact, the actual earnings for the
second quarter fall outside the model's 95% forecasting confidence limits.
Because this study focuses upon daily price changes, it was
necessary to partition these quarterly EPS errors into daily
"announcements." These daily errors v/ere derived by multiplying the
quarterly EPS forecasting errors in Table 5 by the proportion of the
DJIA corporations whose earnings were published in the Wall Street
Journal (c.f. Table 3) on a particular day. For example, on January
20th, three corporations, Alcoa, Allied Chemical, and Westinghouse,
announced their fourth quarter 1977 earnings. These corporations ac-
counted for 1/10 of the total earnings announcements for that quarter.
As a result, the earnings error for January 20th would be 1/10 times
(.526) = ($ .0526).
The second, third, and fourth models given in Table A were used to
estimate the average yield on the U.S. Treasury's weekly 90-day Treasury
33bill auctions during 1978. If as Fama has shown, the short-term inter-
est rates accurately mirror expected rates of inflation, it is possible
to derive a proxy for unexpected changes in inflation by focusing upon
interest rate forecasting errors. Therefore, weekly unexpected errors in
33
Eugene F. Fama, "Short-Term Interest Rates," op. cit . and
, "Rates and Inflation," op. cit .
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TABLE 5
Actual and Forecasted EPS Figures for the DJIA
me Period Actual Forecast Error Lower Upper £
•77 $23.49 $24,016 (.526) $20.32 $27.71 9.31
•78 $22.04 $21,342 .698 $17.67 $25.01 9.60
'73 $29.56 $24,975 $4.6S5 $21.33 328.62 9.37
I '78 $26.40 $27,587 (1.187) 23.82 31.36 12.391
-24-
forecasting inflation are derived by subtracting the ex ante (forecasted)
average rate on the 90-day T-bill auction from the actual average yield.
In turn, these weekly error terms were divided by five to obtain daily in-
flation error terms for the five previous trading days. Although it might
appear that this procedure implies that the market reacts "today" to some
future error, this conclusion is unwarranted. Assume that on Tuesday morn-
ing (the time when the auction's results are published) one makes an esti-
mate via a Box-Jenkins model or some other alternative method of what next
Tuesday's 90-day T-bill average auction rate will be. Based upon the
current and forecasted yields, one can construct an expected daily ad-
justment path for 90-day rates over the next five days. As trading in
the T-bill secondary market takes place, immediate feedback on the ac-
curacy of one's forecast is given.
The Box-Jenkins interest rate models were identified using the pre-
vious 18 months* (seventy-eight weeks) observations. At the end of each
quarter (thirteen weeks) a new model identification was attempted. This
resulted in three models for four quarters. The first two quarters uti-
lized regular differencing and one autoregressive parameter of order
two. The third quarter model used first differences, one autoregressive
term and one moving average parameter, both of order one. The fourth
quarter model was based on first differences and contained only a trend
parameter. Although the identification structure of the models was
updated quarterly, the parameters of each model were recalculated each
week. For ease of exposition, the values for these fifty- two parameter
sets are omitted from Table 4.
-25-
IV. Empirical Results
Our statistical analysis focuses upon the ability of unantici-
pated errors in earnings and inflation estimates as well as option
contract expiration dates, and trading volume to explain the daily
changes in the DJIA.
Tables 6 and 7 contain the results of OLS regression analysis for
daily price changes in the DJIA. The independent variables were errors
(actual-forecast) in expected EPS and inflation, a dummy variable to
control for proximity to option contract expiration, and daily trading
volume. Tables 6 and 7 differ in a significant aspect. In Table 6,
the errors in forecasted earnings were assumed to have been discovered
on the day that a particular earnings announcement was published in the
Wall Street Journal . In contrast, the results reported in Table 7
assume that these errors v;ere "announced" on the day before publication.
This "announcement" EPS error does not imply the existence of insider
information. Instead, it presumes that earnings announcements are trans-
mitted over the Dow-Jones news service network on the day before pub-
lication. This assumption is consistent with the results of a study
by Reilly and Drzycimski on stock splits which showed a large announce-
34
ment effect on the day before actual publication.
In total six regressions are reported in both Tables 6 and 7.
Except for the publication-announcement differences noted earlier, the
34
Frank K. Reilly and Eugene F. Drzycimski, "Short-Run Profits
from Stock Splits," Financial Management, forthcoming.
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respective equations in these Tables are identical. Within each Table
the only independent variable to change is the option-expiration dummy
or indicator variable. The first equation contains a four month dummy
whose value was one on the five trading days preceding the 1978 option
contract expiration dates in January, April, July, and October, Other-
wise, the variable's value was zero. The second equation also contains
a "five preceeding days" dumcy variable; however, the variable was in-
serted for eight months, January, February, April, May, July, August,
35October, and November.
The third and fourth equations contain similar four month and eight
month dummy variables, respectively, but these dummy variables take the
value one for the five trading days after the appropriate expiration
dates. Otherwise their value is zero. Finally, the value for the four
and eight month dummy variables in the last two equations is one if a par-
ticular day is five trading days on either side of an appropriate con-
tract expiration date. Otherwise, the values of these variables are
zero.
The results in Table 6 point to several interesting conclu-
sions. First, although the coefficient of the EPS error term has
the expected sign, none of the coefficients is statistically
different from zero. In contrast, the interest rate or inflation
error term is consistently significant. Further the absolute value
of these coefficients were surprisingly large. The trading volume
coefficients were consistently positive and statistically significant.
35
Recall from Table 1 that four of the DJIA's components had con-
tracts that expired during February, May, August, and November.
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which supports the conclusions reached by Epps. Perhaps the most
interesting results in Table 6 are the coefficients of the option expir-
ation dummy variables. The coefficients of both the four and eight
month, five "preceeding days" variable are negative and statistically
37
significant which confirms Klemkosky's findings. On the other hand,
the coefficients of the five "subsequent days" variables are positive
and negative for the four and eight month variables, respectively, hut
neither of the coefficients is significant. Finally, the ccefficients
for the ten days surrounding the option expiration date are negative,
but only the four month variable is significant. On balance, these
results indicate that, ceteris paribus
,
prior to the expiration of
option contracts the prices of underlying securities tends to fall
while there is no strong tendency for recovery after expiration. There-
fore, the net effect of option expirations is to depress daily security
price changes. Notably, autocorrelation is not a problem for any of
the equations, and the F-values are respectible. Although the adjusted
coefficients of determination are rather low, these results were not
surprising given the random walk characteristics of daily stock price
changes
.
Thomas W. Epps, "Security Price Changes," op. cit .
37
Robert C. Klemkosky, "The Impact of Option Expirations," op. cit .
38
Even though earnings errors are included in the model, it is
possible that option expiration dummy variables might capture an alter-
native effect, uncertainty created by earnings' announcements. (See
James E. Fatell and Mark A. Wolfson, "Anticipated Information Releases,"
op. cit as well as and
,
"Preliminary Evidence of
the Effect of Quarterly Earnings and Dividend Announcements," op. cit
..)
However, a careful comparison of the 1978 quarterly earnings announce-
ment and publication dates for the DJIA (c.f. Table 3) with the option
expiration dates given in footnote 12, indicates little, if any basis
for this hypothesis.
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The results given in Table 7 with one remarkable exception are in
basic agreement with those seen previously. The coefficients and the
statistical significance of the interest rate error, option expiration,
and trading volume variables are almost identical to those seen in
Table 6. Again autocorrelation is not a problem, and the explanatory
power of the equations is respectable given the erratic nature of daily
changes in DJIA. The unique result in Table 7 is the coefficients for
the EPS ''announcement" errors which are all positive, and four of the
six are significant. Regarding market efficiency, the implications of
these results are astounding. Specifically, they imply that by the
time earnings announcements appear in the Wall Street Journal , this "new"
information is already incorporated into stock prices.
Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this research has been to focus upon the impacts
that the expiration of option contracts, errors in forecasts for earnings
and inflation, and trading volume have had upon daily changes in a widely
recognized index of the U.S. stock market, the Dow-Jones Industrial
Average. The results of the analysis point to several interesting con-
clusions. First it appears that the expiration of option contracts,
ceteris paribus , actually depress daily changes in the DJIA. From an
economic perspective, this is perfectly logical and confirms the
39
IfG.emkosky's hypothesis.
39
Robert C. Klemkosky, "The Impact of Option Expiration, ' op. cit .
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Our analysis also provided support for the impact of unanticipated
changes in the rate of inflation and the efficiency with which the mar-
ket processes accounting information. Our parameter estimates consis-
tently confirmed the dramatic effect that inflation plays in determining
the direction of equity prices. From a more practical perspective, our
analysis also Implies that if. inflation can be brought under control,
U.S. equity markets are likely to experience one of the greatest bull
narkets in history.
In contrast to many prior studies that have focused upon the
efficiency with which the market processes accounting and financial
information this research utilizes daily information. Our results
indicate a surprisingly strong degree of market efficiency which points
to the conclusion that by the time earnings announcements appear in the
Wall Street Journal , it is probably too late to react to this "new"
information.
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